Certificateless signatures (CLS) are noticeable because they may resolve the key escrow problem in ID-based signatures and break away the management problem regarding certificate in conventional signatures. However, the security of the mostly previous CLS schemes relies on the difficulty of solving discrete logarithm or large integer factorization problems. These two problems would be solved by quantum computers in the future so that the signature schemes based on them will also become insecure. For post-quantum cryptography, lattice-based cryptography is significant due to its efficiency and security. However, no study on addressing the revocation problem in the existing lattice-based CLS schemes is presented. In this paper, we focus on the revocation issue and present the first revocable CLS (RCLS) scheme over lattices. Based on the short integer solution (SIS) assumption over lattices, the proposed lattice-based RCLS scheme is shown to be existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message attacks. By performance analysis and comparisons, the proposed lattice-based RCLS scheme is better than the previously proposed lattice-based CLS scheme, in terms of private key size, signature length and the revocation mechanism.
Introduction
Identity (ID)-based public-key cryptography (ID-PKC) was introduced by Shamir [1] to break away the requirement of certificates in conventional public-key cryptography (PKC). In ID-PKC, the public key of a user is decided by his/her associated identity information, such as e-mail address, telephone number, social security number, and so on. With the public key of a user, a trusted third party (called private key generator (PKG) produces the user's associated private key and sends it to the user via a secure channel. Thus, the legitimacy of public keys can be verified publicly. Boneh and Franklin [2] employed Shamir's concept to construct a workable ID-based encryption (IBE) scheme using bilinear maps such as Ate, Tate, and Weil pairings. Since the PKG knows all the users' private keys, the PKG may impersonate all the users to forge a signature on any message and encrypt any ciphertext. In such a case, all ID-based cryptographic schemes have the key escrow problem.
In 1993, certificateless public-key cryptography (CL-PKC) was introduced by Al-Riyami and Paterson [3] to simultaneously repeal the use of certificates in conventional PKC and resolve the key escrow problem in ID-PKC. They concretely presented a certificateless signature (CLS) and a certificateless public-key encryption (CL-PKE) scheme. In CL-PKC, the private key of a user includes two parts, namely, a secret value and a partial private key. The secret value is randomly selected by the user while the partial private key is generated with her/his identity by a key generation center (KGC). Hence, the KGC does not know a user's private key so that the key escrow problem occurred in ID-PKC is avoided. In addition, the user independently generates and publishes the public key, so the need of certificates in conventional PKC is abolished. Afterwards, numerous works [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] have addressed the CL-PKC area.
That are several cases that request a user's public key to be invalidated before its preplanned expiration time. Thus, a public-key setting should offer a revocation method to cancel compromised or illegal users from the system. Tseng and Tsai [10] presented the revocation method using public channel. In addition, two primitives (encryption and signature) in revocable certificateless public-key cryptography (RCL-PKC) were also proposed, such as revocable certificateless public-key encryption (RCL-PKE) schemes [11, 12] and revocable certificateless signature (RCLS) scheme [13, 14] . Furthermore, Hung et al. [15] presented a short RCLS scheme.
Indeed, the security of these conventional PKC, ID-PKC, CL-PKC and RCL-PKC mentioned above rely on the difficulty of solving the discrete logarithm or integer factorization problems. However, when quantum computers come into reality, both hard problems would become easy to compute [16] so that those cryptographic schemes based on them would become insecure. Whereas, several new mathematical methods for cryptography have been constructed to resist quantum attacks. For post-quantum cryptography, lattice-based cryptography is significant [17] because no efficient quantum algorithm can solve the related problems that include the short integer solution (SIS) and short independent vector problem (SIVP) problems over lattices. Moreover, lattice-based cryptography is more efficient than other post-quantum cryptographies.
Related Work
For lattice-based cryptography, Goldreicha et al. [18] proposed lattice-based signature and public-key encryption schemes under the conventional PKC settings. Unfortunately, its signature scheme was completely broken in [19] . Afterward, several famous signature schemes were presented, including Gentry et al.'s scheme [20] and Lyubashevsky's schemes [21, 22] . The former is provably secure. In their scheme, Gentry et al. employed the Gaussian sampling and the hash-and-sign techniques, respectively, to produce users' private keys and signatures. However, the private key is lengthy while the hash-and-sign technique is inefficient. Lyubashevsky [21] employed the Fiat-Shamir transformation technique to propose an efficient lattice-based signature scheme while its security is based on the short integer solution problem (SIS) over lattices. The Fiat-Shamir transformation turns out to be more efficient than the hash-and-sign technique when generating a signature. Moreover, to improve the efficiency further, Lyubashevsky [22] proposed another latticebased signature scheme, which employed the rejection sampling technique to produce the signature. Lyubashevsky's second scheme is simple and needs just a few matrix-vector multiplications and rejection samplings.
To combine the advantages of ID-PKC and lattice-based cryptography, Ruckert [23] presented two ID-based signature (IBS) schemes over lattice assumptions. One was shown to be secure in the standard model and the other is secure in the random oracle model. The framework of Ruckert's scheme followed Gentry et al.'s scheme [20] . Therefore, the private key and the signature remain lengthy. Then, several lattice-based IBS schemes [24] [25] [26] were presented to enhance the security and efficiency. Recently, Xiang [27] adopted the binary tree structure used in [28] to construct a revocable IBS (RIBS) scheme over lattices. To improve the efficiency, Hung et al. [29] furthermore presented a new lattice-based RIBS. Their scheme adopted the NTRU lattice in [26] to produce the private key of a user. Therefore, the private key size and signature size are shorter than those of Xiang's scheme.
In the past, the study of the lattice-based certificateless signature (CLS) schemes received little attention. Tian and Huang [30] proposed the first lattice-based CLS scheme. Since they adopted the GPV lattice in [20] to generate the private key of a user, it is of the form ( ) and q being a prime. However, the private key above turns out to be lengthy, so is the associated signature. Therefore, their scheme is inefficient and impractical. Moreover, no study on addressing the revocation problem in the existing lattice-based CLS schemes is presented.
Contribution and Organization
In this paper, we focus on the revocation issue and present the first revocable CLS (RCLS) scheme over lattices while improving the performance of Tian and Huang's CLS scheme [30] mentioned above. Our RCLS scheme provides a revocation method using public channel to cancel compromised or illegal users. The revocation method follows the revocation concept of our previous literature [10] . In our RCLS scheme, a user's private key consists of three parts that include a secret value, a time update key and a partial private key. The secret value is randomly selected by the user while the partial private key is generated with her/his identity by a key generation center (KGC). The point is that the time update key is changed along with time period and the KGC periodically sends new time update keys to non-revoked users via a public channel. If the KGC would like to cancel compromised or illegal users, the KGC just stops generating the new time update keys of these users. In our RCLS scheme, the partial private key is generated by using the key extract algorithm of Ducas et al.'s ID-based encryption over lattices [26] . In the key extract phase, Ducas et al. adopted a particular sampling algorithm to improve Gentry et al.'s key extract algorithm [20] by producing short trapdoor (private key). Meanwhile, in our signing phase, we adopt the rejection sampling technique in [22] to produce a signature. Therefore, our lattice-based RCLS has shorter private key size and signature length than others. Relied on the difficulty of solving the short integer solution (SIS) problem [31] , we show that the proposed lattice-based RCLS scheme offers existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attacks for three adversaries that include Type I adversary (outsider), Type II adversary (honest-but-curious KGC) and Type III adversary (revoked user). When compared with the previously proposed lattice-based CLS scheme, the proposed latticebased RCLS scheme possesses better security and similar efficiency.
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2, preliminaries are presented. The framework and security model of RCLS schemes are given in Section 3. The proposed lattice-based RCLS scheme is presented in Section 4. In Section 5, the security analysis of our scheme is demonstrated. Comparisons are presented in Section 6. Conclusions are drawn in Section 7.
Preliminaries

Notations
Throughout this paper, we denote several parameters as follows: For a set S, the notation y ←S denotes that y is uniformly selected at random from S. For a distribution D, z←D means that z is selected according to the distribution D.
Anticirculant Matrices
Anticirculant matrices have a special structure and useful properties. An N-dimensional
is defined as follows.
Definition 1.
( ) N f C is a Toeplitz matrix represented by
For convenience,
in the sequel. Anticirculant matrices have the following nice property.
Lattice and NTRU Lattice
Here, we briefly define a lattice and an NTRU lattice. A lattice is a full-rank discrete subgroup of R n . And an NTRU lattice comes from a particular class of convolution modular lattices. The detailed definitions are given below. 1 2 , , , n … v v v be linearly independent and
Definition 2. Let n vectors
be the basis of the n-dimensional lattice Λ. The lattice Λ produced by the basis B is presented as
associated with h and a positive integer q is a full-rank lattice of 2N  and is represented as 
Indeed, we can efficiently find F and G. By the following lemma, 
Gaussian Distribution
Here, we present the definitions of the continuous and discrete Gaussian distributions, which are useful tools in lattice-based cryptography.
Definition 4. The continuous Gaussian distribution over N
 with the center cϵ N  and the standard deviation s > 0, is defined as
We scale this distribution for any lattice
so as to make the distribution fitting and acquire a probability function. In the following lemma, Lyubashevsky [22] gave two properties of a discrete distribution , ( )
(2) If σ α = c and α > 0, then
Sampling Technique
According to [31] , if one takes a so-called noise vector from a Gaussian distribution and adds this vector to a lattice, then one can obtain a distribution that is statistically close to uniform one. Based on this, Gentry et al. [20] presented a sampling algorithm and a trapdoor generation algorithm by using the Gaussian sampling technique over general lattices. To reduce the private key size, Ducas et al. [26] improved Gentry et al.'s scheme to propose a particular sampling algorithm over NTRU lattices that can produce short trapdoor by using a short basis
which is generated by TrapGen in the previous subsection. In our scheme, we will use Ducas et al.'s technique to produce the private key of a user by the short basis 
Lemma 5. Given a prime q, an N-dimensional lattice Λ, a short basis
and, there is an algorithm SampleGau( , 
Rejection Sampling Algorithm
Lyubashevsky [22] proposed the rejection sampling technique to sign a message in lattice-based cryptography. This technique is simple and needs just a few matrix-vector multiplications and rejection samplings. Indeed, Lyubashevsky's signing algorithm [22] is different from the one proposed by Micciancio and Peikert [33] even though both algorithms employ similar public keys. The main difference is that Lyubashevsky produces a signature by using the rejection sampling instead of the hash-and-sign technique. Moreover, the sizes of both signature and private key in : 0,1 :
In the sign procedure, the signer takes her/his private key S, public key A and a message μ as input, and returns a signature (z, c). Upon receiving a signature (z, c), a verifier validates the signature using the public keys A and T. The setup, sign and verify procedures of the rejection sampling technique are presented in the following Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Rejection Sampling Technique
Setup(n, λ, m, k)
Verification Key: ,
Sign(A, S, μ):
Verify(A, T, z, c, μ):
Accept it if both conditions 2
Here, we present the main concept of the signing algorithm. The rejection sampling technique is to enable the distribution of the signature (z, c) independent of the secret key S. Thus, we would like to obtain a target distribution z from m D σ , but z in the signing algorithm comes from the distribution 
Hardness Assumptions
In this section, we present the short integer solution (SIS) problem over lattices as the security assumption. The difficulty of solving the SIS problem is equivalent to the difficulty of the worst case of solving the short independent vector problem (SIVP) with an approximation polynomial factor [34] . The SIS problem and its assumption are defined as follows. Definition 6. Let q and β, respectively, be a positive integer and a real number, and 1 2 , ,
, 
As stated in Lemma 3, the distribution of h = g/f is statistically close to the uniform distribution of q R [35] . Hence, the SIS problem on NTRU lattice is to find a pair 1 2
Syntax and Security Model of RCLS
The framework of RCLS scheme is identical to that of the RCLS schemes in [14, 15] . In an RCLS scheme, there are three roles, namely, a key generation center (KGC), signers and verifiers. An RCLS scheme consists of eight algorithms that are defined as follows. By the security model of RCLS schemes in [14, 15] , adversaries have three types that are presented as follows.
•
Type I adversary (outsider): The adversary knows the time update key and the secret value of any entity, which are respectively obtained by listening the public channel and replacing the associated public key.
Type II adversary (honest-but-curious KGC): The adversary may produce the partial private key and time update key of any entity, but it does not know the associated secret value.
Type III adversary (revoked user): The adversary owns the partial private key and knows the associated secret value, but it does not get the current time update key.
Definition 9.
We say that an RCLS scheme has existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message attacks (RCLS-UF-ACMA) if a PPT adversary A with a non-negligible advantage wins the following RCLS-UF-ACMA game, which is cooperatively performed by A and a challenger C.
-Setup. The setup algorithm is performed by the challenger C to produce public parameters Parms and the system secret key KGC S . KGC S is kept secret for C. It is worth mentioning, that if the adversary A is Type II, KGC S is sent to A. Note that for Type I and III adversaries, the KGC plays as the role of the challenger C. For Type II adversary, the honest-but-curious KGC is the adversary A.
-
Queries: A may issue a number of different queries to C adaptively as follows. It is worth mentioning, that Type II adversary has the system secret key KGC S so that it may compute the partial private key and time update key of any entity.
• Partial private key extract queries (ID). Upon receiving the identity ID of a user, C performs the partial private key extract algorithm to produce and return the user's partial private key
Time key update queries (ID, t). Upon receiving the identity ID of a user and a time period t, the C performs the time key update algorithm to produce and return the time update key
Secret value queries (ID). Given a user's ID, C performs the set secret value algorithm to produce and return the secret value ID S to A.
•
Public key queries (ID). Upon receiving the identity ID of a user, C returns ID PK to A.
Public key replacement queries (ID, ' ID PK ). Upon receiving the identity ID of a user and a new public key ' ID PK , C records this replacement.
• Sign queries (ID, ID PK , μ, t). Upon receiving ID and ID PK of a user, a message μ and a time period t. C plays the role of the signer and performs the sign algorithm to produce a valid signature ζ on μ and returns ζ to A.
-Forgery: Assume that the adversary A produces (ID * , * ID PK , μ * , ζ * , t * ). It is worth mentioning, that ID * is the target identity. It is said that A wins the RCLS-UF-ACMA game when the following situations hold:
• (ID * , μ * , t * ) was never issued in the sign queries. •
The verify algorithm on (ID * , * ID PK , μ * , ζ * , t * ) outputs "accept".
• If A is of Type I adversary, the partial private key extract queries on ID * was never issued.
If A is of Type II adversary, ID * was never issued in the secret value and public key replacement queries. • If A is of Type III adversary, the time key update queries on (ID * , t * ) was never issued.
Concrete RCLS Scheme over Lattices
As defined in Definition 8 in Section 4, an RCLS scheme consists of eight algorithms. Here, we propose an efficient lattice-based RCLS scheme. Eight algorithms are presented as follows: , f s N < , and g s N < with short basis ( ) ( )
R . Furthermore, the KGC sets the system secret key SKGC as B and selects two system public keys 1 
Security Analysis
In the following, we demonstrate that our lattice-based RCLS scheme is secure against both Type I adversary (outsider) and Type III adversary (revoked user) in Theorem 1 while the security against Type II adversary (honest-but-curious KGC) is proven in Theorem 2. The proof technique of both theorems employs the rejection sampling technique in [22] and the Forking lemma in [37] . Theorem 1. Let three hash functions 0 H , 1 H and 2 H be random oracles and N be the security parameter. with (IDi, t) from A, C produces a response to this query as follows.
Assume that a PPT adversary A (Types I and III) can break our lattice-based RCLS scheme with non-negligible probability ε. Thus, an algorithm C is constructed to resolve the SIS problem with non-negligible probability
If it is found, the same answer in L1 is returned to A because the query has been ever issued.
2. Otherwise, select 3 4 , w v x μ ) from A, C produces a response to this query as follows.
1. Search ( , , ,
If it is found, the same answer in L2 is returned to A because the query has been ever issued.
Otherwise, randomly select
. Then j c is sent to A and < , , , ,
added in the list L2.
• Partial private key queries: A issues this query along with i ID , C produces a response to this query as follows. ( , ) u u , we say that the adversary A solves the SIS problem. According to the same probability analysis in [22] , if the adversary A can break our lattice-based RCLS scheme with non-negligible probability ε. Then, we can construct an algorithm C to solve the SIS problem with non-negligible probability ( ) w v x μ ) from A, C produces a response to this query as follows.
. Then j c is sent to A and < , , , , ( , ) u u , we say that the adversary A solves the SIS problem. According to the same probability analysis in [22] , if the adversary A can break our lattice-based RCLS scheme with nonnegligible probability ε. Then, we can construct an algorithm C to solve the SIS problem with nonnegligible probability
. □
Comparisons
To show the advantages of the proposed RCLS scheme, we make the comparisons between the previous schemes and ours. For convenience, we define the following notations to count the computational costs. [30] ) and the proposed RCLS scheme in terms of lattice type, public key setting, averting key escrow problem, private key size, signature length, the computation costs of signing and verifying processes. Tian and Huang's CLS scheme is constructed under the certificateless public key settings to solve the key escrow problem, but it does not address the revocation problem. Our RCLS scheme resolves both the revocation and key escrow problems. For the usage of Lattices, Tian and Huang's CLS scheme uses the GPV lattice in [20] to generate the private key of a user. It is worth mentioning, that the related parameters in Table 1 have the following relationships: λ , σ = 12λsN. In Table 2, we choose concrete parameters: N = 512, q = 2 26 , k = 512, d = 31, λ = 14, m1 = 38,400, m2 = 25,600 and make the comparisons of instances in bit-length. According to Tables 1 and 2, for both the private key size, signature length, the computation costs of signing and verifying processes, our RCLS scheme is better than Tian and Huang's CLS scheme. Our scheme adopts public channels to send the periodic time update keys. Indeed, the signing processes of all three schemes mentioned above employ the same the rejection sampling technique in Lyubashevsky's scheme [22] to produce signatures. Here, lets discuss the rejection probability in the signing process. If the rejection probability is too large, the performance of generating signatures may be inefficient. In our scheme, the signer can produce a useful signature 
Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed the first provably secure RCLS scheme with a public channel over lattices, which possesses existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attacks. Under the SIS assumption and in the random oracle model, we formally established the security of our lattice-based RCLS scheme for three types of adversaries, namely, outside adversary, honest-butcurious KGC and revoked user. By performance analysis and comparisons, we have demonstrated that the proposed lattice-based RCLS scheme is better than the previously proposed lattice-based CLS scheme, in terms of private key size, signature length, the security property and the revocation mechanism.
